Th e article deals with the rules for a grant of interim measures in the context of EU law and its application in national judicial proceedings. It covers the key case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU related to the regime, conditions and limits of the interim measures and adds a refl ection of practice of Czech courts. Article pays particular attention to the conditions for suspension ofn the application of national law measures.
Basic framework
In the decisions in cases Rewe 3 and Comet 4 the Court of Justice of the European Union (further only "Court") made it clear that the proper application of EU substantive law is primarily based on the use of national procedural rules. However, these rules may be corrected by principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness. Aft er Rewe/Comet cases the Court used these corrections only exceptionally; its approach turned into more rigorous scrutiny especially at the end of 80s and beginning of 90s starting with Peterbroeck/van Schijndel 5 line of case-law. Th is new development brought in more confusion about the question what national procedures or institutes will not stand the equivalence or eff ectiveness scrutiny.
Th e following analysis will focus on the impact of Court's case-law on the powers of national courts to issue interim measures and provisionally suspend the application of the EU law or national law with consequences for the EU law. A typical feature of these measures is their temporary nature: they are limited, on one end, by the initiation of the proceedings and, on the other, by the fi nal decision on the matter. In many cases, without these powers the fi nal decision of national courts on the substance of the dispute would be deprived of its necessary eff ect. Consequently, particular controversy may concern provisions which do not give national courts the power to adopt interim measures or limit this power to specifi c conditions. From a diff erent perspective, the diversity of procedural regulations of the Member States may weaken the eff ective and uniform application of the EU law in Member States.
Generally speaking, in terms of the EU law the availability of an interim measure is desirable at least for two reasons:
• it contributes to the protection of individual rights which can be threatened by incorrect implementation; • it gives a protection to the EU law itself since an incorrect implementation can compromise the fulfi lment of objectives for which it was adopted.
Since no harmonized EU based legislative rules on interim measures before national courts have been adopted, the basic rules have been formulated by the Court. In the case-law it is possible to distinguish two variations:
1. interim suspension of national law in case that there is an alleged breach of the EU law; 2. interim suspension of the EU law or national implementing regulations if national courts have doubts about the validity of the EU law.
In the following both these alternatives will be analysed with respect to the basic case-law and subsequent cases, including the limits on the application of the EU standards in this area.
Factortame I case: interim measures against national law
Th e fi rst situation was covered in the famous case C-213/89 Factortame I 6 which is oft en mentioned with regard to the establishment of the principle of primacy of the EU law over national constitutional rules. At this point it may be recalled that the dispute before the national court concerned British fi shing quotas which were used by ships with Spanish crew, however, fl ying the British fl ag. It was regarded as an infringement, or as a circumvention of the pro-visions concerning fi shing quotas for the UK. Th erefore, the British regulation conditioned the "law of the fl ag" by a minimum percentage of persons with British nationality within the crew. It was likely that it was a restriction on the free movement of workers and discrimination on grounds of nationality.
7 However, the question was whether the British courts may, until the question is resolved in a preliminary ruling, temporarily suspend the application of the contested regulation. Th is was not possible due to the constitutional doctrine of absolute sovereignty of the British Parliament. Basically, under the British law, an act of the Parliament has to be fully applied until its abolition by the Parliament itself. According to the House of Lords, this presumption of validity was also used in the context of the Factortame I case, 8 although at the same time the House of Lords admitted that the Spanish sailors would suff er irreparable harm if it was not possible to apply an interim measure.
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However, the Court was of a diff erent opinion. Referring to 106/77 Simmenthal 10 case it emphasized the requirement for full and uniform application of the EU law in all Member States and the consequent obligation of national courts to preferentially apply the EU law. In this context it may be noted that according to Italian national constitutional provisions in Simmenthal the national court itself could not disapply Italian law in case of its confl ict with the EU law. Th e contradiction of Italian and European law was perceived by the Italian Corte Constituzionale as a constitutional-level issue. Th erefore, according to the procedures in case of an alleged non-compliance, the court fi rst had to refer the case to the constitutional court which would then decide with regard to the principle of the primacy of the European law about non-application of the relevant Italian legislation. But these powers did not belong to the court deciding the dispute. According to the Court, these procedural regulations prevented application of the EU law and violated the principle of primacy, according to which any national court has the right to directly decide on preferential application of the EU law. Any elimination of confl icting laws is a matter of national procedures that the EU law does not take into consideration.
Similarly, in Factortame I case there was a national-law based obstacle for the national court to fully apply the EU law. Until the authoritative interpretation of the Court and the subsequent priority application in the case concerned, the provisions of constitutional law prevented it from using certain procedural institute: to suspend the application of the national law and provide preliminary or interim primacy to the potentially directly eff ective EU law. Both cases concerned a procedure that prevented or hindered a prompt enforcement of the EU law. Th e diff erence was that in one case the existing procedural steps were found superfl uous; in the second case they were missing.
Th e parallel between the two cases was also refl ected in the reasoning in Factortame I case where the Court referred to the conclusions in Simmenthal case and reiterated that:
"any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the eff ectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and eff ect are incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law. "
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In relation to the assessment of the application of national procedural rules, it is interesting that in Simmenthal case the Court quite emphatically demanded priority application of the EU law, without leaving room for national procedures, even though these procedures ultimately always led to the recognition of the primacy of the EU law -we could say that enforcement of the EU law within the framework of national procedures was ensured. As was noted by Dougan, in Simmenthal case the Court did not work with the space given by Comet/Rewe case-law which in principle accepts the national procedural steps leading to the enforcement of the EU law. Th e Court primarily placed emphasis on full application of the EU law by the court which directly decides the dispute.
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A similar starting position was chosen by the Court in Factortame I case when assessing the powers of the national court to grant an interim measure. In this latter case it also did not refer to the application of the Comet/Rewe principles. With respect to the above fi ndings, the Court stated that: To summarize the aforementioned, according to the Court the eff ectiveness of the EU law would be impaired if the national court would not have the power to suspend the application of the contested regulation in relation to the judgment it is to issue in the given case. If in the absence of restrictive national law it would issue this interim measure, it must have the power to do so. In other words, the national court has this power directly under the EU law. Th is power is, therefore, autonomous and independent on national law.
15 Th at conclusion follows also from the system of legal remedies to protect rights in the EU law which also includes a preliminary ruling. It would be against the eff ectiveness of this procedure and proper application of the EU law, if the national court which initiates a preliminary ruling in a concrete case, could not simultaneously suspend the application of the contested regulation and adjust the position of the parties until the Court considers the matter. Th e time aspect plays a signifi cant role here. In this context it may be noted that the time gap between the start of the preliminary ruling and the response of the Court is not negligible 16 and aft er its expiration without issuing an interim measure, securing the rights under the EU law could be very diffi cult, or even impossible.
However, despite the relatively strict formulation of the decision, the Factortame I case may be read with certain ambivalence as far as the Court's reasoning and the possible impact of its decisions are concerned.
On the one hand, the decision of the Court is formulated strictly towards the national law. With regard to the reference to Simmenthal case and the requirement of primacy of the EU law over national procedural rules which make full application of the EU law unnecessarily diffi cult or postpone it in time it would be possible to argue that the interim measure which restricts the application of potentially confl icting national law must be available; the opposite rule of national law which in Factortame I case did not allow for interim measure to be issued cannot be applied. In this perspective, the national judges would have an obligation to create a new judicial remedy which did not exist in the national 14 It is evident that this interpretation of the Court's decision is highly intrusive both in relation to the national law and to the position of national courts and judges deciding the matter. It requires that the courts become active "makers" of law, both in the absence of codifi cation in a certain area, and in case of (explicit) opposite national rules applied under British law. It does not represent a situation when there is a discrepancy between the written rules of national and EU law (e.g. directly eff ective prohibition of restrictions to the free movement of goods versus its restrictions by the national law) but creating new rules justifi ed by an undefi ned general principle of eff ectiveness. Generally speaking, the position of the courts as "co-makers" of law is more common in Anglo-Saxon legal system which is essentially based on the precedential nature of the decisions of the courts, but it is perceived to be considerably less legitimate in the continental system of law where the courts are strongly linked with the application of statutory law.
From this perspective Factortame I case had a potential to diff erentiate itself from the earlier line of case-law in the area of primacy of the EU law and attitude of the Court to national procedural rules. In previous cases, national courts were encouraged not to apply national law which was contrary to the EU law or to apply written provisions of the EU law instead of national law. Th e cases were related to both substantive 19 and procedural aspects of national law. 20 It did not concern any creation of new procedures but "only" non-application of the existing ones. In Factortame I case, there were no written rules in the British law concerning the powers and procedures of courts neither on national nor on European level. If the Court were to stay with this strict approach which it indicated in Factortame I case, it would lead a signifi cant strengthening of the powers of national courts in the enforcement of the EU law.
But on the other hand -as comments in literature indicate 21 -the Court did not strictly follow that line of reasoning. We cannot overlook the contradiction in its decision. Although it formulated the power of national courts to issue interim measures, it did not further specify conditions under which such measures may be issued, despite the fact that 22 Th us, the Court left their formulation to the national law, more precisely to the application of the principle of equivalence and -in the context of the absence of an equivalent means in British law -to a great extent to the application of the principle of eff ectiveness.
23 Th e ambiguity of the decision can be seen in the fact that the Court did not refer directly to the application of Comet/ Rewe principles; their relevance was confi rmed in later decisions.
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From the aforementioned it is clear that the Court's decision in Factortame I case was not unequivocal and its impact was not as major as might be deduced from above.
25 Th e Court incorrectly interpreted British law and it seems that the rather austere decision 26 was based mainly on the presumption that the remedy concerned was available in British law. Perhaps that is why the Court did not defi ne more detailed rules, leaving the procedures of national courts upon the application of principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness.
It should be added that subsequently British courts dealt with Factortame I case in this way. Th e strict requirement of the Court for the existence of power to issue an interim measure was interpreted narrowly. In Factortame I decision itself, the House of Lords followed the premises of the Court and permitted issuing an interim measure. However, under the instructions of the House of Lords, in other proceedings before British courts when the direct eff ect of the EU law was not entirely clear, interim measures were to be applied only in exceptional cases. As a result of this process, those who applied for this procedural institute were not usually successful.
27 Th is ambivalence required further explanation and it was the Court's motive to further specify the conditions for the issuance of an interim measure in the subsequent case-law.
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Despite the limited interpretation of the fi ndings in Factortame I by British courts, this case may be considered as an important stone in the mosaic of the application principle of the primacy of the EU law, the status or the obligations of national courts in its enforcement, providing protection to individual rights and ensuring their eff ective judicial protection. Th e importance of the case is emphasised for example by Craig and de Búrca; they state that although Factortame I case does not diff er from the previous case-law in purely legal sense, its impacts in the national law are rather dramatic.
29 Th e Court refuted earlier theses that the EU law does not create any new remedies and in the absence of EU harmonization it is dependent on national law. We may remind the aforementioned, purely practical reason for this Court's decision: if it was not possible to issue an interim measure and the rights of the parties would be determined only in the fi nal decision of a national court, in practice this time delay could mean that the fi nal judgment would not be able to ensure proper application of the EU law, it would be useless to the parties and it would irreversibly damage their interests. Th e fact that conclusions in Factortame I needed further clarifi cation is not so surprising. It is a common feature of the dynamic nature of Court's caselaw which may be witnessed in many areas.
Despite the ambiguity of its assessment and diversity of comments, in a wider context Factortame I case can be considered as one of those cases from the early 90s where -under the auspices of application of the principle of eff ectiveness -the Court made more severe interventions into national procedural rules. As indicated above, even the conclusions from Factortame I did not avoid certain clarifi cations. It is connected with the fact that in Factortame I itself the conditions for issuing an interim measure were not explicitly addressed and the Court left it over to the national law. It seems rather strange especially in a situation if these provisions are completely missing in national law. Th erefore, it was up to the national court -in this case the House of Lords -to formulate these conditions. As stated above, the conditions formulated by the House of Lords were not very favourable to recognizing the powers of British courts to issue interim measures; therefore, in practise they were limited only to exceptional cases.
Th e matter of issuing interim measures was opened soon aft er Factortame I in Zuckerfabrick and Atlanta cases. In these decisions, the conditions for issuing interim measures were formulated; both in relation to national legislation implementing the EU law, as well as in relation to the EU law itself. Th ere was also a related question of the applicability of these conditions on a Factortame I case-like situation. Th is was later, aft er almost two decades, clarifi ed in Unibet case. All these cases will be discussed successively below.
Interim measures against national implementing legislation and EU law
From the aforementioned it follows that Factortame I was viewed primarily through the prism of EU law primacy. It confi rmed conclusions about the structural applicational primacy as it was formulated in Simmenthal case. As a result, national procedural rules must give way to ensure full application of the EU law. Th e subsequent case-law on issuing interim measures concerns a slightly diff erent situation. As we noted earlier it is the question of whether and under which conditions the interim measure against the EU law is permitted, either directly or indirectly through national law. In this respect, again we may distinguish two variants:
• suspension of the application of the national implementing legislation which was issued in order to implement the EU law; • suspension of the application of the EU law itself (directly eff ective) without any national implementing legislation.
In the early 90s -in a relatively short time interval -these variations were subject to the Court's decision in preliminary ruling procedures primarily in cases Zuckerfabrik and Atlanta, which were initiated by German courts. In the following part, we will focus closer on these cases and the subsequent case-law.
Interim measure against implementing acts: the basic premise
In relation to national law which was issued in order to implement the EU law, the basic problem lies in the fact that any temporary suspension of implementing legislation which is supposed to "bring the EU law to life" actually suspends also ICLR, 2012, Vol. 12, No. 2. the application of the EU law itself. A temporary suspension of national implementing legislation -i.e. basically the legislation issued at national level under the authorization of the EU legislator -can be at the expense of proper application of the EU law. In some respects this situation is similar to Factortame I: in both situations, national court deciding the matter is to suspend the application of national law, but with consequences for the EU law.
On the other hand, we can see a diff erence from the decision in Factortame I where the interconnection of national law and EU law was not as straightforward as in case of implementing legislation; primarily, it concerned the question of whether the EU law is applied in a particular area, or how it aff ects the powers of the Member States. From this point of view Factortame I is more concerned with the question of division of powers. Th at dimension diminishes if the national law is issued for the purpose of implementing the EU law and it is clear that the national law is in the domain of delegated powers. Th is gives more room to accept a more signifi cant intervention of the EU law into the powers of the national courts to issue interim measures, namely the conditions under which they may do so.
When deciding on interim suspension of implementing legislation, it is possible to distinguish two possibilities that appear in the decision-making of national courts and which also arise from the subject of the preliminary ruling procedure. Th us, the national court can have:
• doubts about the validity of the EU law or • doubts about the correct interpretation of the EU law, and, therefore, its proper implementation in national law.
As far as the validity of EU law is concerned, it should be reminded that national judges themselves cannot declare an act of the EU law invalid or inapplicable in a particular case. Based on the decision in Foto-Frost
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, the Court reserved for itself an exclusive competence to assess the validity and, therefore, also possibly to limit the application of the contested EU law provision. Th e national court can only rely on the presumption of validity of the EU law; in case of doubt it must refer it to the Court. Th e conclusions of the Court regarding the validity or invalidity are binding in all Member States. Th erefore, declaring the EU law invalid is completely beyond the powers of national courts.
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Th e review of validity itself is performed by the Court in several procedures. 39 Th ere is both a direct action for annulment (Article 263 TFEU) before the Court and also indirect actions such as the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) in proceedings before a national court, or plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU) in proceedings before the Court. According to the Court, the founding treaty "established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions, and has entrusted this review Community Courts" 40 and these remedies and procedures as a whole create a complete system to ensure the validity review of the EU law. All these procedures are mutually complementary. When reviewing the validity based on the founding Treaties, the Court is explicitly entitled to suspend the application of the contested regulation.
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From the summary given above it is clear that the review of validity is strictly centralized. In this respect, it would be expected that the review of validity in proceedings before national court should be parallel to the suspension of the application of the EU law by the Court. However -similarly to the situation in Factortame I case -in the written EU law this power is not explicitly stated in relation to decision-making of national courts.
In addition to doubts about the validity of the implemented EU law, a national judge might consider issuing an interim measure in the event of doubt as to the correctness of the implementation of the EU law into national law. First and foremost, in case of an apparent confl ict of national and EU law, the principle of primacy must be followed and if the conditions for direct eff ect are met, the national judge is obliged to apply the EU law directly, omitting the contradictory national legislation.
However, problems may occur, particularly if the EU act is not directly eff ective or its interpretation is not clear, as well as the assessment whether the problematic implementation is in line with the EU law. Th e logic of the situation suggests that the absence of direct eff ect in case of EU acts that require national implementation represent a more likely scenario in practice. At this stage, the national court (of the last instance) should ask the Court for interpretation of the act. It is the exclusive power of the Court to provide a binding and uniform interpretation of the EU law across the whole EU using the preliminary ruling procedure, including the obligatory procedure in case of national courts of the last instance.
42 In addition to the aforementioned procedure, again a national judge might consider issuing an interim measure against the controversial implementation act. From the perspective of the EU law, the negative eff ect is that any suspension of national implementing legislation leads to the suspension of the EU law itself as it is acting through the implementing act.
Regarding the impact on the EU law, both variants -that is issuing an interim measure in relation to both the review of validity and the contested interpretation of the EU law -are the same. Conditions for issuing an interim measure against an implementing act in case of doubt about EU law validity was an issue in Zuckerfabrik; in case of interpretation will be dealt in Kofi sa.
Zuckerfabrik case: challenging the validity of EU law and interim measures against implementing legislation
Th e Court had an opportunity to comment on the question of power and conditions for issuing interim measures when contesting the validity of the EU law in C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik 43 which was decided a year aft er the Factortame I. Th e case concerned a dispute over the legality of an EC regulation and a decision adopted on its basis by German administrative authorities. According to it a levy was collected from sugar producers in order to eliminate the losses of the European Community caused by high export refunds fi nanced by the Community. Th e aim was to ensure the sales of the Community's sugar surpluses to third countries in that given year. One of the questions of the national court was:
• whether the general force of a regulation in the Member States does not exclude the power of national courts to suspend provisionally eff ects of an administrative act adopted on the basis of that regulation until the dispute in the main proceedings is settled; and • about the conditions under which national courts may provide interim protection, or whether this protection is provided purely on the basis of national law or the EU law itself states the conditions which are applicable in this case.
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In relation to the fi rst question the Court concluded that the general character of the regulation does not preclude the power of national courts to suspend the enforcement of a national administrative measure adopted on the basis of the regulation. Th e Court explicitly established a relation between the power to preliminary suspend the application of national law which appears to be in contrary to the EU law, as stated in Factortame I case, and the suspension of application of the EU law under the circumstances of Zuckerfabrik case. Th e aforementioned fi ndings concerned the power of national courts to issue interim measures in Zuckerfabrik case. Only then the Court addressed the conditions thereof. Th us, it was unclear whether the requirement for the same level of protection exclusively concerns the existence of powers or whether it means that also the conditions for issuing interim measures should be the same in both situations. Th is is of particular importance especially for the situation in Factortame I case where the Court did not formulate any detailed conditions. Although at fi rst glance it may seem it is so ("interim protection ... must remain the same ..."), this conclusion does not follow from Zuckerfabrik case quite clearly. Th e Court dealt with the conditions themselves in other parts of the decision where it did not refer explicitly to the Factortame I case.
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As indicated above, in the following part of the Zuckerfabrik decision the Court pursued the formulation of the conditions for issuing interim measures. In case of temporary suspension of the EU law, the national court must refl ect the factual and legal context of the case. Th e national court must take into consideration the following aspects: 47 • it must be convinced that there are serious doubts about the validity of the EU law; • suspension of enforcement must keep the nature of a preliminary decision; • national court deciding on the interim measure may order suspension only until the Court rules on the question of validity; • if the question is not subject of proceedings before the Court, the national court is obliged to seek a preliminary ruling; • adoption of interim measures should prevent serious and irreversible damage to the party seeking its adoption. It means that the damage should occur before the prospective decision of the Court on the validity of the contested regulation; in principle purely pecuniary damage cannot be regarded as irreversible; • when deciding on interim measures, national courts must respect the existing case-law of the Court on validity of the disputed acts; • national court must take into account the interests of the Union, especially the damage to the EU resulting from non-application of the contested act; it must also take into account the possible impacts on individual interests and national interests; • if the interim measure poses a threat to the fi nancial interests of the EU, national court must require adequate fi nancial guarantees (e.g. the deposit of money or other security).
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Th e Court then summarized these conditions into three basic points when an interim measure would be admissible:
1. national court has serious doubts regarding the validity of EU measures and if the validity of the act is not yet subject to decision of the Court, it will seek a preliminary ruling; 49 2. there is demand and threat of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant; 3. the national court takes into account the EU interests.
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Th ese general conditions have been regularly repeated by the Court in the subsequent case-law.
51 Th e Court set these conditions fairly strictly; with regard to the erga omnes eff ect of the decisions in preliminary rulings, these conditions are applicable uniformly before courts in all Member States.
In the light of the aforementioned considerations regarding the correlation between the review of validity of the EU law and the implications of the interim measures issued by the national court, it is not surprising that the Court explicitly related the conditions to those applicable in the review of validity in an action under Article 263 TFEU.
52 Due to the dependence of national courts on the decision of the Court regarding the (il)legality of EU secondary legislation, adopting an interim measure by a national court might be regarded as ancillary to the review validity of the EU law by the Court, whether this review is carried out in a procedure under Article 263 or under Article 267 TFEU. Hence, from this perspective, the application of the same conditions for issuing an interim measure as by the Court itself seems to be logical.
To summarize the fi ndings in Zuckerfabrik case, it may be noted that:
1. the Court confi rmed the existence of power of national courts to issue interim measures and to preliminary suspend the application of the EU law; 2. unlike in Factortame I case, the Court set quite detailed conditions that must be met for the issuance of an interim measure.
In this regard, Ward highlights the diff erent approach of the House of Lords in the instructions for the British courts on issuing interim measures following the decision in Factortame I case and the requirements of the Court formulated in Zuckerfabrik case, particularly with regard to the emphasis on safeguarding the interests of the EU.
53 It is diffi cult to determine whether in its decision the Court responded also to the restrictive interpretation of the conditions formulated by the House of Lords. However, even in the Court's case-law the Zuckerfabrik case does not represent a signifi cant shift . Although the conclusions regarding the powers and conditions seem to be logical and reasoned by the cohesiveness of the system of preliminary validity review, 54 at the same time it is a signifi cant interference into the national rules governing the procedures before national courts. Th e requirements of the Court may cause national courts considerable complications. While previously it was suffi cient for national courts to fulfi l criteria set by national law, aft er Zuckerfabrik case it also has to examine the case-law of the Court and the General Court regarding interim measures. Th us, national courts are bound to monitor EU interests, analyse the damage that may arise to the EU or decide on the appropriate fi nancial guarantees for the EU. From this perspective, Zuckerfabrik case refl ects Court's activist period of the early 90s in relation to national procedural rules.
Atlanta case: interim measures directly against the EU law
A slightly diff erent variation in relation to Zuckerfabrik case and an interim measure against national implementing act is the situation where the national court questions the legality and application of the EU law directly, without any mediation via implementing acts.
Th e question of power and the conditions for issuing an interim measure in this legal context was dealt with by the Court a few years aft er the Zuckerfabrik decision in case C-465/93 Atlanta.
55 Th e core of the dispute was the EU regulation establishing banana import quotas.
56 Th e importers of bananas from third countries into the EU were deprived of the duty-free quota. For that reason, in proceedings before a German court they contested the legality of the EU regulation and at the same time they requested this duty-free quota as an interim measure. In one day the German court both asked for clarifi cation of the conditions for preliminary suspension of application of an EU act and asked about the validity of the given EU regulation.
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Th e Court confi rmed that if a national court has doubts about the legality of an act and at the same time it starts the preliminary ruling procedure, it also has the power to preliminary suspend the application of an EU act. Further it concluded that in the proceedings before the national court the same conditions as in Zuckerfabrik case are applicable.
But Atlanta case enabled the Court -in its own words -to further clarify these conditions. 58 First, the Court specifi ed how to interpret the factual and legal circumstances leading the national court to serious doubts concerning the validity of the regulation, as formulated in Zuckerfabrik case. According to the Court:
hat requirement means that the national court cannot restrict itself to referring the question of the validity of the regulation to the Court for a preliminary ruling, but must set out, when making the interim order, the reasons for which it considers that the Court should fi nd the regulation to be invalid."
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Th erefore, in addition to initiating proceedings for a preliminary ruling, the national court must demonstrate that there are valid reasons for the suspension of the application of the EU law. According to the Court, when assessing the question of invalidity, national court must take into account the degree of discretion of the EU institutions in the sector concerned. One can imagine that fulfi lling this condition requires a good knowledge of the EU law and decisionmaking processes and, therefore, again it makes it signifi cantly more diffi cult for the national court to grant interim measures or, at least, to ground them properly. Th e question of assessing discretion of the EU institutions is the subject of litigation before the Court and in practice we can hardly imagine how competent the national court is to be able to examine this issue.
60 On the other hand, it is signifi cant to follow how strictly or to what details the Court would require the application of this condition in practice, and whether at all a decision of a national court in a particular case will ever get before the Court. As far as we know it has not been at the core of the Court's subsequent decisions on interim measures. 59 See ibid, point 36. 60 A general reproach might be added that these conditions aff ect especially the activities of lower courts without suffi cient analytical background, for which, due to their work load, it will be diffi cult to analyse the Court's case-law in this area in details.
Th e practical diffi culty in fulfi lling conditions and requirements for sound reasoning can be seen from further "clarifi cation" according to which the act in question is not to be completely divested of effi ciency. According to the Court the national court must examine the cumulative eff ect of its decision. Th erefore, it has to examine what are the implications for the application of the EU law if a large number of other national courts provisionally suspended the application of the act concerned.
61 In this regard, the specifi c situation of the parties must be taken into account; whether these particular circumstances distinguish them from other persons. 62 It cannot be overlooked that the wording of this condition closely resembles the restrictive concept of individual concern adopted by the Court when determining the locus standi of underprivileged applicants in the action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
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In addition, the Court commented in more details on the condition that requires national courts to respect the Court's earlier decision in the given matter. Th us, if the Court has already rejected the merits of an action for annulment or found no grounds for invalidity in a preliminary ruling procedure, the national court concerned cannot suspend the application, or it must cancel the measures already taken. An exception is the case when the national court refers to other grounds of invalidity.
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In the overall conclusion of Atlanta case the Court reiterated the three conditions formulated in Zuckefabrik case and explicitly it added a fourth condition: when deciding on interim measures, the national court must take into account all decisions of the Court and the General Court on the legality of regulations or on the requests for similar interim measures at the EU level.
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In general it can be concluded that Francovich/Factortame III, Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases create a couple and in the subsequent case-law they are usually quoted together. When a national court is deciding on an interim measure either against national implementing acts based on potential invalidity of EU law as well as directly against the EU law, it bases its decision on the same conditions or reasoning.
In Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta a logical connection to procedure before the Court/ General Court in review of validity was made. We cannot object to the fact that the Court requires the use of the same conditions as it uses itself. By this the Court established the basis for uniform EU-wide standards/conditions that are further elaborated in the subsequent case-law. We believe that these fi ndings are a natural consequence of the requirement for a unifi ed judicial protection of the individual rights in the validity review of EU law.
Finally, one can deliberate a little bit on the fact that the requirement for a uniform interpretation was formulated only in the early 90s in Zuckerfabrik/ Atlanta cases. Th is relates to the developments at the EU level. For a long time the question of interim suspension of application was not dealt uniformly even in the proceedings before the Court. Th e situation changed in connection with a signifi cant increase in applications for interim measures in the 80s 66 and then in in the late 80s when the Court began regularly to refer to the conditions formulated in its previous decisions on the admissibility of interim measures; thanks to this the judicial doctrine in proceedings at the EU level started to unify. Th e creation of the General Court, i.e. the Court of First Instance at that time, also signifi cantly contributed to the stabilization of conditions since the two-tier judicial system allowed for appeal against the decisions of the Court of First Instance to the Court.
67 Th ese facts help to explain the creation and more detailed specifi cation of the conditions for interim measures also in proceedings before national courts.
T. Port case: outer limits for interim measures
Finally, the third major case which clarifi ed the scope of powers of national courts to issue interim measures was C-68/95 T. Port case.
68 Similarly to Atlanta case, the T. Port case concerned a regulation which established quotas on imports of bananas into the EU.
69 Th e importing company, however, did not contest the validity of the regulation but claimed that due to temporary problems with the supplier of a third country its quota -determined by the volume of imports in previous years -was not properly set. Th e importer demanded an interim mea- sure which would grant it a higher quota. Th e case reached the German Federal Constitutional Court which confi rmed the claim for the interim measure also with regard to the regulation itself which allowed for taking this kind of diffi culties on the part of importers into account. In subsequent proceedings before the German Court of Appeal this issue was addressed again, and questions concerning the powers to issue interim measure regarding the application of the given regulation were referred to the Court through the preliminary ruling procedure.
Th e Court upheld the conclusions from Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases; 70 but at the same time it distinguished T. Port from these cases. T. Port case did not primarily concern the review of validity of the regulation but the provision of judicial protection for individuals which must be considered in the overall context of the EU judicial system. Th e regulation itself enabled to issue an interim measure; but it had to be authorised by the Commission which should determine the existence and extent of the rights of traders. Th e Commission did not issue the measures but that did not constitute the power of national courts to do so. Likewise, the demand that the Court stated inaction of EU institutions cannot be subject of preliminary ruling procedure. Both the Member States and the traders themselves are provided with a remedy either by a direct proposal of the Commission, or in particular through the proceedings for failure to act. In these proceedings directly the Court or the General Court is entitled to decide about interim measures.
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T. Port case therefore complemented Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases; a national court is entitled to issue an interim measure if the validity of the EU law is contested. But the national court cannot substitute the powers of EU institutions to issue interim measures if they are attributed to them by the EU law. From this perspective, T. Port case represents a limit for the powers of national courts in this area.
ABNA case: power of administrative authorities to issue interim measures
Finally, there is a very interesting recent decision in joined cases C-453/03 ABNA 72 concerning the status of administrative bodies. Th ese cases were brought by three courts of diff erent Member States (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy) concerning the validity of the EU directive on the circulation of compound feedingstuff s. istrative authorities have powers to issue interim measures and to suspend the application of the contested act, or whether this power belongs only to courts in the review of the administrative decision. In the context of this case it is important to mention that the court of the Member State had already issued an interim measure and at the same time the proceedings for a preliminary ruling on the review of the validity of this act had been initiated. Th erefore, the conditions for issuing this interim measure, particularly with regard to the examination of the (strict) conditions of Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases, had to be met. In this situation it seems that issuing interim measures by administrative authorities of (other) Member States is justifi ed.
However, the Court was of another opinion. It summarised its conclusions regarding the conditions for issuing an interim measures in Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases and the position of national courts as to give full eff ect to the EU law.
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Although the national public authorities assume that these conditions are met, they are not entitled to issue an interim measure under these conditions because:
• the status of those bodies in general cannot provide the same degree of independence and impartiality as the status granted to the national courts; • it is not certain that these authorities are able to ensure adversarial trial which allows to hear out the arguments put forward by the parties before weighing their interests and making the decision.
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Th ese conclusions are not compromised by the need for speedy proceedings when it is in the interest of the participants to provide them with protection as quickly as possible. According to the Court, also courts can issue interim measures promptly; the necessity for speed or economic aspects of proceedings cannot prevail over the guarantees provided by judicial proceedings.
76
Th us, while the administrative authorities have a duty to preferentially apply the EU law in case of its confl ict with national law, 77 on the other hand, when they should provisionally disapply the EU law, they do not have the same power as the national courts to issue an interim measure. And not even if they consider that the conditions for its issue were met, not even if objectively these conditions were met in another case and assessed by a court of (another) Member State. Th erefore, interim measures of this type can be issued only in subsequent judicial proceedings. 
Case-law following Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases
In subsequent cases the Court elaborated conditions formulated in Zuckerfabrik and Atlanta cases in specifi c situations. One of them is the case C-334/95 Krüger 78 in which the Court accepted the possibility to appeal against the decision of a national court to issue an interim measure while this measure remained in force. Th e preliminary ruling regarding the validity of the EU law would lose its meaning only if a superior court changed or cancelled the decision on interim suspension of application of the act concerned.
79 In C-17/98 Emesa Sugar 80 the Court confi rmed that Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta conditions apply even if the national court decides on interim measures against authorities of non-member countries which are responsible for the implementation of the EU law (specifi cally from overseas countries and territories).
Finally, the range of variations is complemented by a decision in the form of an order of the President of the Court in C-186/01 Dory.
81 Th e case concerned the interpretation of the directive implementing the principle of equal treatment for men and women 82 which -according to Mr. Dory -was violated by Germany by introducing conscription for men only. Th e German court initiated a preliminary ruling procedure.
83 In these proceedings Mr. Dory demanded that the Court issued an interim measure and suspended the application of the decision of the German military administration ("call-up"). In his rejecting order the President of the Court pointed out to the indisputable character of the preliminary ruling procedure under which, unlike in direct actions, the Court is not entitled to grant such interim measure. Due to the division of competencies this is a task for the national court, under the conditions stated in Zuckerfabrik case. whether these conditions apply also in relation to situations like Factortame I. When we compare, on the one hand, Factortame I and, on the other hand, Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases and the subsequent case-law, we can see an obvious difference in the elaborateness of the Court's reasoning. While in Factortame I the Court did not formulate further conditions for interim suspension of national law, in the context of interim measures against national implementing legislation or directly against the EU law there is a whole set of conditions for national courts.
One of the reasons for this discrepancy can be deduced from the fact that in Factortame I, the Court focused primarily on the question whether the EU law itself gives the power to national courts to issue an interim measure even if the national law did not permit it. Th us, the Court (intentionally) did not deal with the conditions 85 and left the matter to the application of national regulation (with regard to Rewe/Comet cases while following the principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness). However, with respect to the subsequent development in Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases, a dilemma remained whether Factortame I case is only the fi rst step in the development of EU rules on interim measures and the subsequent case-law represents clarifi cation also in relation to this case, or whether in Factortame I case the Court intentionally left out detailed conditions and, as a result, indicated that diff erent conditions for interim measures should be applied.
In academia conclusions regarding the diff erences in both situations were not perceived unambiguously. Th is is well illustrated in Dougan's work who argues that conditions formulated in Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases could also be used for granting an interim measure in relation to the situation in Factortame I case.
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Th erefore, it would be possible to apply these conditions in parallel in relation to interim measures, or to temporary suspension of the application of national law in case of an alleged confl ict with the EU law, whose validity is challenged. Th is is based on the requirement that individuals should be protected in both situations in the same way, and also on the requirement for uniform application of the EU law.
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But simultaneously Dougan pointed out that the Court itself did not explicitly equate the situations in Factortame I and in Zuckerfabrik/ Atlanta. Consequently, it can be argued that those conditions need not be necessarily uniform, with respect to the diff erent perspectives of both situations. In Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta the presumption is that the Court has an exclusive power to assess the validity of the EU law; granting an interim measure suspending its application is closely related to it -the Court leaves this decision up to the national court under prearranged conditions. On the other hand, in Factortame I the situation concerned an assessment of the compatibility of national law with the EU law where the requirement for the very existence of an interim measure is suffi cient, given that other conditions may be governed by national law while respecting the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness.
88 Th e Court had the opportunity to solve this dilemma in Unibet case.
Unibet case: refi ning the rules
A recent case C-432/05 Unibet 89 may be labelled as exceptional. It covers an interesting mix of diverse topics regarding the eff ective enforcement of EU law in the context of national procedural rules, especially:
 application of the principles of eff ectiveness and equivalence;  clarifi cation of the rule that the EU law does not create new remedies;  conditions for issuance of interim measures or actions for damages; and  generally, the right to eff ective judicial protection.
Since the decision was linked to several important questions of national procedural law, it should be examined in more detail, including several references to the main conclusions in the opinion of Advocate General Sharpson who aptly analysed some controversial points.
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Th e case concerned the Unibet company -operating betting (lottery) games -which wanted to advertise its services in Sweden. For this purpose it obtained an advertising space in several Swedish media. However, in Sweden betting and lotteries were strictly regulated and all lotteries for public were subject to authorization by the competent administrative authorities. It was forbidden to promote participation in an unpermitted lottery organized in Sweden or in a lottery run outside Sweden. In accordance with this act the Swedish authorities took a variety of measures against the media which cooperated with Unibet company, including criminal procedures.
Th e Unibet company, even though it was not the participant of these proceedings, fi led an action against Sweden, the aim of which was to declare that under then Article 49 of the Treaty (free movement of services, now Article 56 TFEU) it had the right to promote its services in Sweden. At the same time, the Unibet company sought an interim measure in order to be provisionally admitted to exercise the rights until the decision in action for declaration, and, fi nally, it sought compensation for the damages resulting from the confl icting regulations and procedures of Swedish authorities. In the proceedings the Swedish court referred several questions to the Court concerning:
• obligation to include in national legislation a separate action aimed at determining the compatibility of the EU and national law if the national law permits only incidental review; • obligation to provide interim protection through which national law is provisionally prevented from being applied if the applicant claims a breach of the EU law; • conditions/criteria on which such an interim measure should be granted.
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Th e obligation to allow for a separate declaratory action
In relation to the admissibility of interim measures it was necessary to decide whether the EU law forces national law to introduce a declaratory action. Th is is connected with the issue of interim measure which has an ancillary nature and can be used only in other pending proceedings. However, in Swedish law, there did not exist a separate action for declaration that would allow to examine the compatibility of national and EU law. Th is review was permissible incidentally, i.e. in other proceedings (e.g. for damages). National courts at various levels declared this action inadmissible because in their opinion it did not meet the legal requirements for its fi ling. In particular, there was no specifi c legal relationship between the Unibet company and the Swedish state. Consequently if the court admitted the action, it would equal to an abstract examination of the compatibility of a regulation with the EU law, and under Swedish law that was not possible.
In this respect, the basic question for the Court was whether the right to an eff ective remedy guaranteed by the EU law in the general principles of law contains the right to direct action for declaration of compatibility of national and EU law, or whether it is suffi cient to have this review incidentally within related proceedings.
92 According to the Court in the absence of uniform rules, Member States have the right to determine the competent courts and procedural requirements to ensure the protection of rights guaranteed by the EU law. Only if there were no procedural means at national level -not even incidental -it would be possible to confer rights on individuals stemming directly from the EU law. When making these considerations, the Court referred to Rewe/Comet cases and to the case-law regarding the primacy of the EU law, including the aforementioned Simmenthal and Factortame I cases. Th e Court confi rmed its earlier case-law that the EU law did not intend to create new procedural tools other than those governed by national law. However, this rule is only a starting point and it depends on the context whether with regard to the principle of eff ectiveness, specifi cally eff ective judicial protection, it will be necessary to apply certain procedural measures, even if they are not available in national law.
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Th e Court then concluded that a diff erent situation would be if there were no procedural means ensuring not even incidental protection of rights of subjects participating in the proceedings -that is a situation when protection of rights of individuals is not adequately guaranteed by national procedural law.
95 Th erefore, it is up to the national law to determine the locus standi of individuals on condition that national treatment must not interfere with the right to eff ective judicial protection and the principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness are applied.
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In Unibet the Court explicitly formulated the obligation of euro-conform interpretation 97 of national procedural rules in the context of ensuring eff ective judicial protection when it stated that:
"it is for the national courts to interpret the procedural rules governing actions brought before them, such as the requirement for there to be a specifi c legal relationship between the applicant and the State, in such a way as to enable those rules, wherever possible, to be implemented in such a manner as to contribute to the attainment of the objective, referred to at paragraph 37 above, of ensuring eff ective judicial protection of an individual's rights under Community law".
98
Th en in the light of these general observations the Court analysed Swedish law with regard to the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness, and concluded that the principle of eff ective judicial protection as such does not require the existence of a separate action seeking primarily to challenge the compatibility of national provisions with the EU law. In principle, it is suffi cient that the compliance can be examined indirectly in other proceedings. According to the Court these proceedings include also the action for damages; the assessment, if it is necessary to create a new procedural means, depends on whether a claim for compensation is suffi cient to ensure the right to eff ective judicial protection. As inferred e.g. by Taborowski, this situation is the norm and, in practice, the alter- nation of existing procedural legislation by the principle of eff ectiveness is suffi cient, and new procedural means do not need to be created.
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It should be added that according to the Court procedures are considered not to be available if the person: "… was forced to be subject to administrative or criminal proceedings and to any penalties that may result as the sole form of legal remedy for disputing the compatibility of the national provision at issue with Community law".
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Th is argument obviously off ers a parallel to the case-law of the Court which concerns insuffi cient locus standi of individuals to bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Th e circumstances of the well-known Jégo-Quéré case show that individuals may have the only chance to violate the EU law in order to contest the validity of the legislation in subsequent legal proceedings.
101 It seems that contrary to the case-law regarding the locus standi of individuals to bring the action for annulment the Court is not so restrictive in relation to the locus standi of individuals in proceedings before national courts in favour of the EU law. To require the breach of national law as the only tool for the party to launch the review of compatibility is in breach of the right to eff ective judicial protection (as opposed to the action for annulment and situation in Jégo-Quéré case).
For example Arnull describes this ambivalent approach of the Court to the interpretation of the right to eff ective judicial protection as extremely damaging cohesion of Community law and a threat underminig the spirit of cooperation. 102 In the previous case-law, the Court intervened also when there was a need to create new procedures but the obligation of national courts to create new remedies was not clearly defi ned in this regard. 103 In Unibet case, the Court openly admitted that the principle of eff ective judicial protection may require new procedural means. Th us, any uncertainty on this issue was eliminated.
104 Anyway, Unibet case potentially opens the way for greater intervention into national procedural rules. Without wanting to underestimate the aforementioned criticisms or analyse in detail the reasons why in cases like Jégo-Quéré the Court did not loosen the conditions for fi ling an action for annulment, 105 in practise there are relatively few cases when the Court abandoned its doctrine formulated in Nold case and inferred the obligation of national courts to create a new procedural means. Th ough it might be done by the principle of eff ectiveness directly by national courts, in our opinion it is in fact unlikely that in such a sensitive situation national court would create a new procedural means using solely its own discretion, without referring the matter for a preliminary ruling.
Rather theoretical dimension of these considerations is apparent also in Unibet itself where the Court concluded that in Swedish law there were suffi cient (indirect) means and this direct "intervention" was not necessary.
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Th e power to grant an interim measure As indicated above the availability of action for declaration is closely connected with the right of subjects to achieve the grant of an interim measure to suspend the application of national legislation. Th e question is whether the principle of eff ective judicial protection requires the legal order of a Member State to set up the possibility of granting interim measures until the competent court decides on the conformity of national law with the EU law.
judicial protection requires the national court to be able, none the less, at that stage, to grant the interim relief necessary to ensure those rights are respected."
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In other words, the aim of these measures is to achieve interim protection of rights which the applicant claims in the matter itself. Th erefore, it is important that the substantive action is possible; and if it is, interim measures must be available too. On contrary, if no such action is possible in the case concerned, according to the Court it is not admissible to decide on interim measures in the matter.
In that regard we may refer to the opinion of Advocate General Sharpson who points out to the employ of Factortame I. Th ere the Court concluded that the national court deciding the case shall have the power to issue interim measures. According to Sharpson, in case of inadmissibility of an action the national court should not be regarded as the court hearing the case, and, thus, concludes the inadmissibility of any interim measure itself.
111 In this regard she foreshadowed the subsequent decision of the Court.
Th e Court has not mentioned the third variant yet -that is the case when the admissibility of action is uncertain under national law; therefore, it is disputable whether the absence of a procedural means is consistent with the EU law or with the principle of eff ective judicial protection. In the case of uncertainty the national court should have the power to issue interim measures.
112 In Unibet decision it is possible to see a shift in the case-law, since in previous cases it was not disputed that the "main" proceeding was admissible and interim measure was just ancillary to it. However, the Unibet case shows that this is not necessarily always the case and that the principle of eff ective judicial protection may require granting a relatively independent interim measure even without clarity over the locus standi of subjects to bring the merits of the case.
As we noted above, with regard to the circumstances of the Unibet case itself, the national court found the declaratory action unavailable and in the context of procedural means provided by the Swedish law it was not prescribed even under the EU law. Th erefore, it was not possible to grant an interim measure. However, outside this framework the Court ruled the admissibility of interim measures in action for damages which was fi led by the Unibet company and which was admissible. Th e Court held that:
"…where the competent national court examines, in the context of the claim for damages, whether the Law on Lotteries is compatible with Community law, it must be able to grant the interim relief sought, provided that such relief is necessary, which it is a matter for the national court to determine, in order to ensure the 
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In the fi nal phase the Court referred to the national court and its assessment about the necessity of the interim measures in a particular case. In this respect, we can see certain insuffi ciency in the arguments of the Court which essentially requires and presupposes the review of compatibility of national and EU law in an action for damages. Arnull points out that this strict requirement may be in confl ict with the principle of procedural economy, and it is not always an available means of reviewing the compatibility of EU and national law.
114

Conditions for issuing interim measures
Finally, for purposes of this analysis the key point are the conditions under which a national court grants interim measures.
115 Th e Swedish court directly asked whether the conditions in Factortame I and Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases are the same or diff erent, as was discussed in the previous subsections. In Unibet case the Court had a "chance" to clarify this dilemma. In this respect, arguments used by the Court in Zuckerfabrik case might be used as a starting point: the protection provided by interim measures must remain the same, regardless of whether the compatibility of national legislation with the EU law or the validity of secondary EU legislation are questioned; in both cases the dispute is based on the EU law itself.
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Th is issue was again raised by the Advocate General Sharpson, according to whom this statement primarily concerned the existence of power to issue interim measures and not the conditions for that. In her opinion, in situations like Factortame I or Unibet, i.e. regarding the compatibility of national and EU law, an analogy with action for annulment in Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta does not apply, and, thus, it is not necessary to apply the same criteria as the criteria used by the Court when reviewing validity.
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In this regard the Court held as follows: Th erefore, the Court endorsed the view embodied in the opinion of the Advocate General. In doubt about the compatibility of national and EU law, the conditions of domestic law should be used and when applying them the national courts are limited (only) by the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness.
Th ese fi ndings may be criticized with regard to the principle of uniform application of the EU law as they could lead to diff erent conditions applicable in various Member States.
119 However, we do not believe that granting interim measures in the event of a confl ict of national and EU law must necessarily be tied to uniform conditions in all Member State. It is not a fi nal judgment, and the damage that might result from evidently faulty application of the EU law even in the form of interim measure could be compensated. From a more general point of view, it can be assumed that in situations like Factortame I/Unibet, there is no reason not to respect the characteristics and customs of national procedural rules.
Anyway, in Unibet case the Court upheld the fi ndings of Factortame I case and the diff erent circumstances and conditions associated with the grant of interim measures in Factortame I and Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases. It can be regarded as a sign of an increased respect of the Court for national procedural rules, done in a similar way in other cases at the end of the 90s and at the beginning of this century. 
For example Ward
121 in this regard refers to C-1/99 Kofi sa 122 case which concerned a disapplication of a decision issued by national administrative body taken on the basis of the EU regulation establishing the EU Common Customs Tariff .
123 Th e question for preliminary ruling was formulated in terms of whether the power to suspend the application belongs only to the customs authorities, as specifi ed in the EU Common Customs Tariff , or also to national courts. Th us, it was a question of interpretation of specifi c provisions of the EU legislation.
On the one hand, the Court confi rmed that according to the wording of the Common Customs Tariff this power is exclusively reserved for the customs authorities; however, at the same time such a provision must not undermine the principle of eff ective judicial protection as a general principle of law. 124 Th erefrom the Court deduced the power of national courts to suspend the implementation of the decision of the customs authority in order to ensure the full eff ectiveness of the judgment which is to be issued. 125 Here the Court explicitly refers to the passages from Factortame I case where it deduced the power of national courts to grant interim measures.
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Since in Kofi sa case the question of a preliminary ruling concerned the powers (as in Factortame I case) and not the conditions for its implementation, in our opinion the Court did not need to argue with Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases where those conditions were dealt with. Aft er all, in these cases regarding the power of national courts it also referred to Factortame I case. 127 In Kofi sa case the Court could limit itself only to general statements on the existence of powers as was already decided in Factortame I. Th us, based on the Kofi sa case itself, without Court's explicit formulation, we cannot unequivocally conclude that these conditions would not be applicable.
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Th erefore, the Kofi sa decision did not answer the question whether a situation regarding contested interpretation of the EU law and suspension of national implementing law might be considered equivalent to suspension of national law in cases such as Factortame I. Th e Factortame I case also concerned the interpretation of primary EU law and arguably contradicting national law which could (possibly) result in EU law based individual rights. If the case is examined from the perspective of a national judge, this situation is largely analogous to granting interim measures in relation to national law without any direct links to EU obligations. Simply put, it is the application of national law whose compatibility with the EU law is challenged, and intervention or impact of the EU law depending on its potentially incorrect interpretation is uncertain.
In this situation, the national judge will naturally follow procedural rules laid down in national law, including the possibility to preliminary suspend the application of national law; they may exercise the option to leave the examination of the EU law validity to the preliminary ruling procedure and -based on Factortame I decision -they will have the power to suspend the application of the contested national legislation. When formulating this power in Factortame I case, the Court also primarily required the application of the principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness and generally demanded engagement of national procedural rules.
Since, except for Kofi sa case, the question of issuing interim measures against implementing acts in case of an ambiguous interpretation was subject to decisions of the Court rather rarely, 129 judicial conclusions are not entirely clear and an analogy has to be used. In the absence of explicit case-law of the Court in this matter, we incline to the application of the same conditions as in case of doubt about the compatibility of national and EU law, and, therefore, to the use of (only) the principle of eff ectiveness and equivalence formulated in Factortame I. We fi nd this situation closer to the circumstances of Factortame I than of Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases. Th is conclusion can be supported by the general trend in the recent case-law of the Court to mitigate the interference in national procedural law.
Summary EU law rules on interim measures
It is clear from the above that the requirement for full application of the EU law has been the leitmotif for the Court to actively formulate the conditions for interventions in national procedural rules. Individual conclusions can be summarized in a few generalised instructions for national courts:
• the power to issue an interim measure in situations like in Factortame I
and Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases: in both situations national courts have the power to decide on interim measures even if the national procedural rules do not allow it. Th e legal basis for this power is based directly on the EU law; • conditions for interim measure in situations like Factortame I: in case of an alleged contradiction between national and EU law the conditions for issuing interim measures are not formulated in the EU law. Th e Court requires only a general test of equivalence and eff ectiveness;
129 See Siples case which was decided at the same time as Kofi sa case and did not bring anything fundamentally new.
• conditions for interim relief in the situations like Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta: in case of an alleged invalidity of the EU law national courts are bound by the conditions formulated in these cases. Conditions for assessing the admissibility of preliminary measures are the same as those applied by the Court in the validity review of the EU law; • a separate claim for interim measures in Unibet case: in case of an alleged contradiction between national and EU law the Court does not require a separate locus standi for interim measures if the main procedure is not admissible unless the right to eff ective judicial protection is violated; • conditions for issuing interim measures in case of doubt about the correct implementation -in situations like Kofi sa: here the general principles of eff ectiveness and equivalence are applied just as in Factortame I case; • launching a preliminary ruling in case of doubt about the validity: simultaneously to the decision on interim measures suspending the application of EU law the national court must seek a preliminary ruling; • launching a preliminary ruling procedure in case of doubt about the correct interpretation: if the national court has any doubts about the compatibility of EU and national law, or about the correctness of national implementation, then with regard to the principle of the primacy the national court applies the directly eff ective EU law immediately without taking into account confl icting national implementation. If at the same time the interpretation on the EU act is unclear and if it is the last instance court, it has an obligation to seek a preliminary ruling; • the enforcement of the obligation to issue an interim measure by individuals: even though most analysed cases concerned primarily the power of national courts to issue interim measures if a national court does not issue an interim measure when all the conditions are met, it equals to a violation of the EU law. Individuals might make claims in appeal proceedings or claim a compensation for the damages caused by the violation of the EU law by its incorrect application; • the enforcement of the obligation to issue an interim measure by an action under EU Treaties: a Member State is responsible for breach of the EU law by its courts and may be sued by the Commission (see the action under Article 258 TFEU). Th is is especially true in case of noncompliance with the conditions for issuing interim measures against implementing acts. Th e analysis might be concluded by one more general note. Th e formulation of strict conditions in Zuckerfabrik/Atlanta cases does not mean that the role of national courts is simple and problem-free. For example, the condition that national courts must consider the impact in EU-wide context and take into account the consequences that would arise if the national courts (in other Member States) decided not to apply the act in question is -in our opinion -in everyday practice of (especially lower) courts rather diffi cult to fulfi l. Th is question needs to be seen with regard to preserving procedural economy -i.e. the time gap which occurs until the response from the Court in the given case. Impacts on EU interests are mitigated by the requirement to provide suffi cient (fi nancial) safeguards by the party seeking the action, but -despite this -the safeguards will be used only aft er the fi nal decision of the Court. Th erefore, it can be expected that national courts will be rather reserved to decide on interim measures against the EU law.
Granting interim measures in situations like in Factortame I/Unibet/Kofi sa cases is not much clearer. Th e failure to comply with these conditions is -due to the content vagueness of this principle in particular cases -diffi cult to prove and we suppose that in practice national courts will have a considerable space for their own assessment of the matter.
Anyway, in both types of situations it will also be up to the parties of the dispute which will be interested in getting the interim measure to persuade the national court that the all the conditions are met.
Czech procedural rules, EU law and interim measures before Czech courts
Th e previous text gave a complex analysis of EU rules on interim measures. In the following we will focus in short on the practice of Czech Courts in the area of procedural rules. Th e basis is formed by decisions of the Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court and Constitutional Court that may be found in their public databases.
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Th e Supreme Court deals as a last instance court mostly with civil and penal cases. Our research on these cases did not unveil any case which would directly concern the issue of interim measures with a clear link to the EU law. Th e EU law-based cases even do not elaborate on the principle of national procedural autonomy and the principles of eff ectiveness and equivalence as adjudicated in Rewe/Comet cases.
132 Th e EU law based cases concern more precedence of EU law and its application in the area of substantive law or the CILFIT criteria con- cerning the preliminary ruling procedure.
133 Th e Supreme Court uses the referral to the principle of eff ectiveness and equivalence only exceptionally, for example when endorsing EU law-based rules on state liability for breach of EU law.
134
Th e Supreme Administrative Court is the highest Czech court dealing with appeals in administrative-law cases. In relation to the EU law it is more explicit in its referrals to the EU law compared to the Supreme Court. In the area of Czech procedural rules vis-à-vis the EU law requirements we could mention f. e. application of EU asylum rules and direct referral to the principle of national procedural autonomy, 135 acceptance of principle of equivalence in customs proceedings 136 or in the application of EU completion rules, 137 national rules on the party's right of participation in licensing proceedings in transport services. 138 However, so far we have not found any case dealing directly with granting interim measures and the implication of EU law based rules as are set up in the Court's case law.
Similarly, we are not aware of any cases of the Czech Constitutional Court that would open the issue of national procedural autonomy or specifi cally EU rules on interim measures if application of EU law is concerned.
Th e quick survey given above made it clear that the Czech highest courts deal with the EU rules on the application of national procedural rules rather scarcely, if at all. An exception is the Supreme Administrative Court and even this court does not deal with it explicitly very oft en. In the cases footnoted above it generally accepts the basic principles and does not deal in much detail with subsequent "intricate" case-law of the Court. To refer to the subject matter analysed in this paper, it seems that none of these courts has dealt specifi cally with the grant of interim measures against EU law or national implementing law. We might speculate on the reasons thereof; however, we suppose that an important part in the EU law enforcement should be the parties themselves who might use the EU rules to support their interest -that is valid also in relation to the interim measures -these measures might be required by one party to postpone the use of a national rule to its disfavour; however, the recourse to strict EU law based rules might be used also as a tool for the party in the dispute to whose detriment the issue of interim measures is aimed.
We assume that one of the reasons for infrequent use of EU law based corrections (principles of equivalence and eff ectiveness) is their complexity and the Court of Justice case-law that sets up these rules. So far, the Czech legal literature has not dealt with these procedural rules extensively. We might also share an optimistic view that any recourse to the EU rules has not been necessary yet; and the Czech procedural rules "suffi ciently" protect EU law interest. Be it as it may, we suppose that the application of national procedural rules should be the rule and the recourse to, on one hand, casuistic and, on the other, rather abstract EU rules may and probably will remain quite rare.
